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Abstract
Logical systems are often characterized as closure systems, by means of
unary operators satisfying Reflexivity, Idempotence and Monotony. In order
to capture non-monotone systems, Monotony can be replaced by Cumulativity,
namely Restricted Cut and Cautious Monotony. This short note shows that in
such a context, Restricted Cut is redundant.
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1 Introduction
Tarski [7] introduced abtract logics, as consequence operations, later popularized by
Scott [6] in connection with consequence relations à la Gentzen [3] (see also Gabbay
[2]). The outcome is that abstract logics are often identified with closure operators
over sets of formulas of a logical language. In symbols, given a logical language
consisting of the set of formulas F , a consequence operator is any C defined over 2F
that satisfy all three axioms below:
X ⊆ C(X) (Reflexivity)
C(C(X)) = C(X) (Idempotence)
X ⊆ Y ⇒ C(X) ⊆ C(Y ) (Monotony)
In an insightful attempt to also capture logical systems failing it, the last axiom was
weakened by Makinson [5] into
X ⊆ Y ⊆ C(X) ⇒ C(X) = C(Y ) (Cumulativity)
It was soon split into two “halves” dubbed Cautious Monotony and Restricted Cut.
X ⊆ Y ⊆ C(X) ⇒ C(X) ⊆ C(Y ) (Cautious Monotony)
X ⊆ Y ⊆ C(X) ⇒ C(Y ) ⊆ C(X) (Restricted Cut)
It is the purpose of this note to show that, in its more natural context (Reflexivity
and Idempotence), Cumulativity is not the combination of the two “halves” but is
actually equivalent to one of them, namely Cautious Monotony.
Actually, it is shown below that if all three of Reflexivity, Idempotence, and
Cautious Monotony hold, then so does Restricted Cut. In semantical terms, it means
that f(A) ⊆ A together with f(f(A)) = f(A) and f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A ⇒ f(B) ⊆ f(A)
give f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A ⇒ f(A) ⊆ f(B). Indeed, from f(B) ⊆ f(A) ⊆ B ⊆ A, it follows
that f(B) ⊆ f(A) ⊆ B, so f(A) = f(f(A)) ⊆ f(B).
2 The One Direction for Cumulativity
We switch to a sequent presentation (freely drawn upon Kleene [4] and Dummett
[1]) as the result is less obvious there, although no less striking. That is, we consider
a generalization of sequents
X1, . . . , Xn ⊢ Y
such that the antecedent X1, . . . , Xn consists of countably many formulas given as
a (finite) series of sets for the sake of brevity. Thus, the rules have the following
general form where Wi, Xj , Y, Z denote countable sets of formulas and proviso is a
condition:
X1, . . . , Xn ⊢ Y
W1, . . . , Wm ⊢ Z
proviso
Such a rule means that if proviso is true then W1, . . . , Wm ⊢ Z can be derived from
X1, . . . , Xn ⊢ Y .
The axioms, written here as rules with no premises, are meant to encode Reflexivity
and have the following form
X ⊢ Y
(X ∩ Y Ó= ∅)
As for the rules, first please observe that we cannot include Left Thinning due to
the motivation for Cumulativity. For the sake of brevity, we do not provide all rules
and we resort to a rule mixing Left Interchange and Left Contraction as follows
Merging:
W, X, Y ⊢ Z
W, Y ⊢ Z
(X ⊆ Y )
Idempotence:
{x | X ⊢ x} ⊢ Z
X ⊢ Z
In a monotone compact logic, the effect of Idempotence is in fact obtained through
Restricted Cut. For such a logic, Idempotence is indeed an admissible rule in a
sequent system with Restricted Cut (even as an admissible rule). However, Cumu-
lativity (i.e., Restricted Cut and Cautious Monotony) was originally motivated by
non-monotone logics hence postulating Idempotence makes sense when considering
these logics.
Cautious Monotony:
X ⊢ Z
X, Y ⊢ Z
(y ∈ Y ⇒ X ⊢ y)
Restricted Cut:
X, Y ⊢ Z
X ⊢ Z
(y ∈ Y ⇒ X ⊢ y)
This formulation is intended to exhibit the fact that, under the same proviso, Cau-
tious Monotony and Restricted Cut trigger converse inferences.
Theorem: Restricted Cut is an admissible rule in any system enjoying Idempotence,
Merging and Cautious Monotony.
Proof. 1. Applying Cautious Monotony (X = Γ and Y = Θ)
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
(θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ)
Stated otherwise, if (θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ) then (γ ∈ {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⇒ Γ,Θ ⊢ γ).
2. Applying Cautious Monotony (X = Γ,Θ and Y = {γ | Γ ⊢ γ})
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
Γ,Θ, {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⊢ ∆
(γ ∈ {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⇒ Γ,Θ ⊢ γ)
3. In view of what we just proved in Step 1, we obtain
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
Γ,Θ, {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⊢ ∆
(θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ)
4. Trivially, if (θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ) then Θ ⊆ {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} hence applying Merging
gives
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
Γ, {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⊢ ∆
(θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ)
5. According to the axioms, Γ ⊆ {γ | Γ ⊢ γ} hence applying Merging again gives
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
{γ | Γ ⊢ γ} ⊢ ∆
(θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ)
6. Lastly, applying Idempotence yields
Γ,Θ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
(θ ∈ Θ ⇒ Γ ⊢ θ)
which is exactly Restricted Cut.
The author is aware of not being the first to figure all this out but after discussing 
with various colleagues working in the field, it appears that this was largely ignored, 
and unpublished to the best of his knowledge, hence it could justify a brief note such 
as the present one.
3 Conclusion
Reflexivity and Idempotence are the most desirable features of a logical system. If 
Monotony is to be weakened, Cumulativity conveys the attractive idea that inter-
mediate conclusions could be, as premises, freely added or freely removed without 
changing the overall set of conclusions. However, we have shown that Cumulativ-
ity is, unexpectedly, captured by part of the idea, Cautious Monotony, although 
the latter only imposes that intermediate conclusions could be removed from the 
premises with no loss among conclusions. In other words, the other part of the idea, 
Restricted Cut, is actually otiose with respect to weakening Monotony, or Full Cut 
for that matter. Is there a context in which Restricted Cut would play some logical 
role? (Please observe that a formal role is possible, together with Reflexivity, as 
Idempotence ensues.)
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